Warning signs for hype in school-based assessment: Implications for training and pedagogy

Ryan L. Farmer¹, Ryan J. McGill², Adam B. Lockwood³, Stefan C. Dombrowski⁴, Gary L. Canivez⁵, and Imad Zaheer⁶

¹ The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN; http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1409-7555
² William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5138-0694
³ Kent State University, Kent, OH; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2015-247X
⁴ Rider University, Lawrenceville, NJ; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8057-3751
⁵ Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5138-0694
⁶ St. John’s University, Queens, NY; https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6375-0277

Correspondence concerning this manuscript should be addressed to Ryan L. Farmer, The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN 38152. E-mail: rlfarmer@memphis.edu

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Abstract
This article addresses the use of hype in the promotion of clinical assessment practices and instrumentation. Particular focus is given to the role of school psychologists in evaluating the evidence associated with clinical assessment claims, the types of evidence necessary to support such claims, and the need to maintain a degree of “healthy self-doubt” about one’s own beliefs and preferred practices. Included is a discussion of topics that may facilitate developing and refining scientific thinking skills related to clinical assessment across common coursework, and how this framework fits with both the scientist-practitioner and clinical science perspectives for training.

Keywords: assessment; hype; scientific thinking; epistemology; evidence
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The importance of evidence-based assessment (American Psychological Association [APA], 2006, 2017) in school psychology is well recognized. This framework assists with accurate decision-making related to diagnosis and treatment selection in a variety of practice settings (e.g., clinics, schools). In addition, using scientifically-grounded practices may mitigate the risk for various types of harm (Lilienfeld, 2016; Lilienfeld et al., 2019), including, but not limited to, allocating scarce resources and time, and inefficiently and inadvertently relying on inadequate information that may lead to misdiagnosis. The latter, in particular, may lead to unnecessary denial of needed services, placement in an overly restrictive therapeutic environment, and/or the provision of practices that may be ineffective or, in some cases, cause harm. McFall (1991, 1996, 2000) advocated that integrating science into psychological practice meant that claims associated with any given practice should be thoroughly scrutinized including weighing the risk of the potential negative side-effects against anticipated positive gains—what Lilienfeld and colleagues (2019) considered the underlying rationale of the evidence-based practice (EBP) movement. Clinical practices that fall outside of what evidence supports have been referred to as low-value practices (LVPs) within the professional literature, because they have not been shown to be beneficial, are less effective than other available alternatives, or are therapeutically unnecessary and/or contraindicated by research evidence (McKay et al., 2018). In contrast to LVPs, Pratkanis (1995) and others (e.g., Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018; Travers, 2016) refer to pseudoscience or pseudoscientific practices as another problematic class deserving consideration in these discussions. Generally, whereas demarcation between science, non-science, and pseudoscience is made upon the dual lines of theoretical understanding and
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empirical evidence (Pigliucci, 2018), LVPs are primarily focused on the functional outcomes of the practice itself (see McKay et al., 2018). This sets LVP in direct contrast with EBP, and pseudoscientific practices in direct contrast with science-based practice (Lilienfeld et al., 2018). Pseudoscience is best understood in contrast with science (Pigliucci, 2018). For simplicity, we only refer to LVP in this manuscript to emphasize the importance of clinical outcomes. Despite the risks associated with using untested and questionable approaches, assessment practices in school psychology are muddled with LVPs (e.g., Allen & Hanchon, 2013; Benson et al., 2019, 2020; Gross et al., 2019; Kranzler et al., 2020; Silva et al., 2020; Sotelo-Dynega & Dixon, 2014).

What maintains the use of LVPs is not well understood. There are likely several contributing factors such as the dissemination and promotion of selected LVPs in graduate education (J. Cook et al., 2009), in textbooks and interpretive guidebooks (Farmer et al., 2020), and through continuing education sources (Washburn et al., 2019). Other factors such as outdated, inconsistent, or misinformed district and state guidelines (e.g., Maki et al., 2015; McNicholas et al., 2018) may also maintain such practices but are of a different kind given their authority in clinical practice. For instance, school psychologists may continue to use the IQ-achievement discrepancy model despite decades of evidence against its use (Aaron, 1997; Dombrowski et al., 2004). To be clear, the promotion of a practice is neither problematic nor does it suggest that the practice is wholly without merit. In fact, a critical component of effective scientific communication is the promotion of scientific findings (Kappel & Holmen, 2019), which is necessary for disseminating effective practices. However, effective science communication and training have ‘trust’ as a central goal (see B. Cook et al., 2018 for a discussion of the role of trust in science). Lewis and Wai (2021) discussed the importance of communicating the limits of our understanding and the uncertainty of our claims. Hype, an
exaggerated and potentially harmful kind of promotion, is the endorsement of a practice above and beyond the available evidence, or in direct contradiction to the evidence that is available at the time of the claim. When this occurs and exaggerated claims go unquestioned, LVPs may be adopted in lieu of practices whose evidentiary basis is more firmly established. Nevertheless, we stipulate that for scientific psychology to progress, there needs to be a balance of innovation and critique. As noted by Lilienfeld and colleagues (2015), “Reflexive dismissal of the new and untested is ill advised as is blind acceptance” (p. xxii). Being able to distinguish between scientific innovation and hype is critical for achieving this balance.

**Healthy Self Doubt**

Whether we choose to call it epistemic humility (Kidd, 2016; Lilienfeld et al., 2017), philosophic doubt (see Deitz, 1982), or simply “healthy self-doubt” (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018, p. 23), the premise is a critical behavior for school psychologists and a pillar of EBP (National Association of School Psychologists, 2020). Adopting the attitudes consistent with healthy self-doubt means (a) acknowledging that some of the beliefs we have are fallible and that (b) review of evidence for and against those beliefs is necessary to calibrate one’s position. Lilienfeld et al. (2017) suggested that helping students to develop healthy self-doubt is an underlying tenet of both the scientist-practitioner and clinical-science models of training—we extend this claim to also include school psychology programs. Graduate programs that train students to function as scientist-practitioners likely do so to improve students’ awareness of their own blind spots and knowledge gaps so that they can better evaluate their own beliefs and claims about clinical practices (Lilienfeld et al., 2017). Thus, despite the emphasis on research productivity, the ideological strengths of scientist-practitioner programs are the emphasis on scientific thinking and the development of professional skepticism. Regardless of whether a
training program explicitly adheres to this model of training, we argue that critical thinking and scientific literacy are foundational to most, if not all, recognized training standards in school psychology (e.g., NASP, 2010). Recognizing that we are all susceptible to cognitive biases, such as illusory correlation and causation (Chapman & Chapman, 1969; Lassiter et al., 2002), establishing these dispositions is an important first step in beginning to understand the inherent uncertainty a clinician must confront in professional decision-making tasks. From this starting point, a school psychologist’s confidence in a course of action is based on the quality and quantity of available evidence for and against a given practice as there are few, if any, practices that have been found to be infallible.

These philosophical and aspirational underpinnings are not easy to implement nor are they easy to teach. Learning to balance increased skepticism with epistemic humility is challenging. This practice is further complicated when supportive evidence is exaggerated or when contradictory evidence is devalued, minimized, or even suppressed. In particular, when school psychologists must confront multiple information sources competing for their time and attention (e.g., social media, clinical lore, trade publications; Youngstrom et al., 2015). For this reason, graduate students may benefit from explicit instruction in recognizing the warning signs of hype and overconfidence as they learn to navigate the EBP literature (Lilienfeld et al., 2017).

The Promotion of Low Value Practice

Pratkanis (1995) described a number of approaches often used to promote LVPs, such as setting unattainable but idealized goals, leading with high-probability requests, and self-anointed credibility. Whereas Pratkanis described methods used to promote LVPs, he also described methods that proponents have used to redirect criticism of their claims. For instance, it may be asserted that researchers cannot understand a practice’s utility because they are not engaging
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directly in that particular practice (i.e., they are not practicing school psychologists). Despite the populist notions invoked by such appeals, these approaches serve to change the conversation from evaluating the evidence for a claim or position to raising doubt about the expertise or intentions of critics, and may discourage skeptical individuals from asking questions, thereby functioning to avoid careful critical review of the quality of available research evidence. It is necessary to point out that these strategies are sometimes also used to promote practices that are regarded by the scientific community as valid clinical approaches (Wilson, 2003). The distinction appears to be in how the promoter handles and presents the available evidence. We believe it important to be aware of these strategies as there is also value in considering strategies often used in the promotion of school psychological assessment instruments and practices.

Lilienfeld and Meichenbaum (2018) provided a checklist for hype in psychotherapy that provides school psychologists with a series of “warning signs” that a particular clinical practice may be of low value. They suggested that checklists of this kind may be helpful in identifying questionable tactics often used to market practices or to exaggerate their evidentiary basis. In the interest of facilitating the critical evaluation of psychological assessment practices, we provide a provisional list of warning signs to prompt school psychologists to further evaluate assessment claims in clinical science. Again, these strategies are offered to promote a more skeptical and critical evaluation of claims rather than outright rejection of claims. To clarify, the presence or absence of these provisional indicators does not mean that the claims being made should automatically be dismissed or accepted. But the determinant of adequacy is determined by the quality and quantity (replication) of evidence.

Warning Signs of Hype in Psychological Assessment
In the following section, we provide a brief discussion of 12 different potential warning signs of hype in school psychological assessment. These strategies may not be unique to LVPs and they should not be considered an exhaustive explication of all of the tactics or practices and forms of argumentation that have historically been associated with hype movements in psychological science.

**Evasion of Peer Review**

Although imperfect, peer-reviewed journals are regarded by scientists as the gold-standard for the development, exchange, and evaluation of scientific ideas. Whereas many proponents of LVPs make regular contributions to the peer-reviewed literature, all too often problematic assessment practices are disseminated and popularized in non-refereed forums (e.g., workshops, non-empirical books and chapters, and podcast discussions). This is not to suggest such forums do not contain useful information (especially as digital platforms become more popular in our profession); instead, we suggest that when these venues serve as the primary (or only) vehicle(s) for dissemination of these practices, school psychologists should view them with a higher degree of skepticism (Washburn et al., 2019). For instance, publishing mechanisms for tests and test data are largely protected from peer review until the test is already on the market, and already promoted and sold as clinically useful. While many publishing companies should be commended for sharing their data with independent researchers for evaluation afterwards, these evaluations are rarely integrated into the instrument’s technical documentation and therefore less likely to be read by users.

**Unqualified Belief in the Infallibility of Clinical Judgment**

When LVPs have psychometric shortcomings, proponents may imply that they can be overcome through the skilled use of clinical judgment. However, this ignores the considerable
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errors associated with overreliance on this approach to test interpretation (e.g., Garb, 1998), including an increased risk of confirmation bias, (i.e., the inclination to seek out or interpret evidence in a manner consistent with one’s prior beliefs [Nickerson, 1998]). Some scholars go so far as to describe clinical judgment as an almost mystical process. For example, when describing a popular approach to interpreting intelligence test scores (i.e., "Intelligent Testing" [IT; A. S. Kaufman, 1994]), Fletcher-Janzen (2009) noted that IT “ascends to the concrete where all deductive and inductive judgments are guided by theory, translated by the clinician, and synthesized into an elegant whole” (p. 25). Rather than caution users against over-interpreting or misinterpreting data and guarding against potentially committing Type I (false-positive) errors, some interpretive guidebooks suggest that preference in clinical assessment should guard against committing the inverse. Such recommendations overlook the fact that abnormal scores are common in the normal population and thus inferring disorder or disability from such observations may lead to over-pathologizing healthy clients (Odland et al., 2015). As noted by Faust (2007), appeals to “integrate all of the data” (p. 67) as a safeguard against decision-making error assumes that validity is cumulative and that each unique piece of information has an additive effect on our ability to make more effective clinical decisions. While the intuitive appeal of this synthetic exercise and the desire to develop an idiographic understanding of the individual is understandable, such practices may reduce judgmental accuracy (see Bowes et al., 2020).

Lack of Connectivity and Failure to Self-correct

Well-developed theories and methods in the psychological sciences typically exhibit a degree of connectivity. That is, as new research findings emerge, aspects of the theory or method are modified accordingly. A useful analogy is the crossword puzzle, with individual answers filled in based on clues, but then re-evaluated each time another clue is answered to determine

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whether the initial conclusion remains a good fit (see Haack, 1993). Mutual support of the pieces is obtained when various pieces of the puzzle fit well together. However, assessment claims that contradict existing evidence (without providing compelling evidence of their own to counter these concerns) should be viewed critically. For instance, claims that results from cognitive ability tests can be used to determine treatment for students struggling with academic content are inconsistent with the empirical findings that suggest such test results do not accurately predict specific learning disabilities (McGill et al., 2018) and generally reflect poor support for aptitude-by-treatment interactions (Burns et al., 2016; Kranzler & Floyd, 2019, pp. 413-431).

Self-correction of beliefs is necessary and ongoing. LVP often lack this key characteristic and may be marked by an insularity where negative research findings are dismissed or are not acknowledged in any meaningful way. As previously mentioned, proponents of these methods may also dismiss countering claims by using tactics such as suggesting that critics do not have the requisite knowledge to critique the technique in question or that they do not understand the procedures to render a valid opinion on the matter. Additionally, proponents may also invoke elaborate post hoc explanations to explain away negative research results. While these explanations may be plausible, the fact that they were not disclosed as potential limitations a priori raises questions about their veracity (Meehl, 1967).

**Potential Presence of Conflicts of Interest**

Any conflict of interest, financial or otherwise, poses an increased risk of bias or motivated reasoning. Although current estimates are not available, Truscott et al. (2004) found that undisclosed financial conflicts of interests were rampant in the assessment literature in school psychology and there is no available evidence to suggest that the state of our science has improved in any meaningful way since, or that these conflicts of interest (COI) do not apply to

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other subfields (e.g., clinical psychology) given the shared commercial interests in play.

Although a COI does not negate a person’s expertise or the veracity of the content they provide, COIs may be a harbinger for undisclosed bias. However, when potential COIs related to the products and processes a person is attempting to advance are not disclosed, it raises concerns about the degree to which all available evidence is being faithfully disclosed. We invite the reader to consider how frequently they have observed presenters of commercial products (e.g., the publisher of a test) at conferences share contradictory evidence regarding their product. For example, it is not uncommon for proponents of a theory or practice to only selectively report research results that are supportive, while “file-drawering” negative evidence and creating the artificial impression that all is well (Boccaccini et al., 2017). As a consequence, school psychology practitioners and trainers are encouraged to consider the degree to which potential COIs may promote such allegiance effects. As noted by Gibbons (2015), commercial COIs often serve as an incubator that permit LVPs to flourish by impeding scientific self-correction from taking place.

**Appeals to Eminence**

In some cases, questionable psychological theories or practices feature a proponent who has attained authority or eminence in their respective discipline (Pratkanis, 1995). In some cases, these individuals may be respected members of the academy and/or skilled practitioners with advanced content area expertise. Eminence may be amplified by social media where critical review is often absent (Koppl, 2010). As noted by Gambrill (2012), these effects are particularly insidious when a practice is popular and widely accepted; the pressure to conform often conspires against those that raise critical questions about the method in question. Beyond the aforementioned commercial stakes that may incentivize and perpetuate hype movements, it is
also important to consider the motivations that may undergird one’s desire to maintain their leadership role regarding a popular clinical practice. For example, proponents have likely invested years of time, effort, and intellectual capital developing various assessment methods and techniques. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome this psychological “sunk-cost” (Olivola, 2018) in recognizing that one’s efforts have not been fruitful.

**Ad Hoc Credentialing Programs**

There are now several certification programs that have been developed in the field that appear to be designed primarily to promote the use of particular assessment techniques. Whereas these certification programs may serve to legitimize controversial assessment methods, some have questioned the utility of these types of credentialing pathways (e.g., Pelletier et al., 2004). Aside from the costs involved to obtain these credentials, it is unclear to what degree their development has led to improved assessment practices. Gambrill (2012) noted, “There is a huge bogus credential industry fueled by the importance attributed to credentials and the assumption that they yield competence to practice” (p. 38). In navigating this landscape, it is important to evaluate whether a particular credential or professional development program is accredited or recognized by a legitimate professional organization, follows recognized practices in conferring advanced titles in professional psychology (e.g., American Board of Professional Psychology), and charges reasonable fees for the certification being sought. Moreover, school psychologists should confirm that the skills taught by these credentialing programs lead to functional improvements for students by careful evaluation of supporting literature; they may check to see if studies have been published on the specific named practice, whether those effects have been replicated by independent researchers, and if contradictory evidence exists.

**Dismissing Scientific Methods as Misinformation**
Rather than debate the merits of their proposed methods, when confronted with negative research evidence, proponents of hyped practices often dismiss the methodologies employed by critics as being narrow in scope or outdated; these arguments are used even when the proponents of hype movements have relied primarily on those same methodologies to support their premises in the past and continue to use those methods to support current efforts. For instance, proponents for interpreting index scores from cognitive ability tests may dismiss interpreting scores primarily representing $g$ by claiming it to be a statistical artifact, despite evidence for the various scores stemming largely from the same methodological practices (e.g., confirmatory factor analysis; McGill & Dombrowski, 2019). When clear methodological or analytical justification is not provided, this should be regarded as cherry-picking of preferred results (Meehl, 1978).

**Appealing to Cash Validity**

As noted by Frazier and Youngstrom (2007), there is a tendency among consumers to assume that more expensive tests and assessment approaches translate to higher quality as compared to less expensive (or sometimes free) approaches. This fallacy appeals to a relationship between assessment utility and instrument (or training) cost, when such a relationship likely does not exist (Thomas & Callan, 1992). Put simply, just because an assessment instrument costs more does not mean that it is more useful than available technologies that are more cost effective. For example, despite a number of rating scales available for purchase to help school psychologists identify the function of a student’s challenging behavior, there is little evidence to suggest these rating scales correspond to gold standard assessment practices for identifying functional hypotheses (Iwata et al., 2013). While these measures are found to be superior to strictly descriptive assessment, the most well-validated (e.g., the Questions About Behavioral Function; Smith et al., 2012) are available for free online. That some free measures are likely
equivalent—and perhaps superior—to paid-measures seems to be true for traditional psychological rating scales as well (Becker-Haines et al., 2020).

**Grandiose Claims Despite Stagnant Technology**

Although it is frequently asserted that various assessment technologies are new or modern, most advances to our instrumentation have been incremental and not disruptive (Frazier & Youngstrom, 2007; Thiel & Masters, 2014). For example, the Wechsler scales of intelligence features many subtests that are direct descendants from measures developed during the Army testing program from WWI (Kevles, 1968). Yet, proponents of modern assessment methods suggest that advances in technology now permit school psychologists to accurately use these technologies to diagnose and select treatment for sundry conditions despite little compelling evidence to support these claims. One example is profile analysis of cognitive test results which, despite some changes, have largely remained the same over the past 20 years (McGill et al., 2018) while another is the continued use of projective testing in clinical settings (Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Appeals to novelty should not be accepted unless appropriate supporting evidence is furnished *a priori* (Glutting et al., 2003).

**Rebranding Previous Ideas Without Addressing Research Criticism**

In a comprehensive review, McGill and colleagues (2018) noted that it is remarkable how modern approaches to test interpretation share the same characteristics as original approaches that are now regarded within the canon as outdated and empirically unsupported. In this way, many contemporary approaches are simply reparameterizations of previous practices with little, if any regard for the shortcomings associated with previous versions of those approaches that are well documented. In this way, there appears to be a collective devotion within the field to these particular LVPs (e.g., cognitive profile analysis) that allows them to flourish despite little to no
compelling research evidence. As noted presciently by Sagan, “Sparse and poor popularizations of science abandon ecological niches that pseudoscience promptly fills. If it were widely understood that claims to knowledge require adequate evidence before they can be accepted, there would be no room for pseudoscience” (2011, p. 6). It is important for consumers to be able to identify when a practice is revolutionary or merely “old wine being put into new wineskins.”

*Neuro-Realism, Neuro-Essentialism, & Neurobabble*

Three interrelated concepts—neuro-realism, neuro-essentialism, and neurobabble—play an interesting role in contemporary assessment. Neuro-realism is the notion that neurological images (e.g., functional magnetic resonance images [fMRI]) bring an objectivity or realism to the topic that is not possible with psychological or behavioral theory (Racine et al., 2005). This notion was famously explored by McCabe and Castel (2008) who found that images of brain scans increased perceptions of credibility of related scientific research. Relatedly, neuro-essentialism is a reduction of complex human characteristics to the brain, or to interactions within the brain. This type of reductionist perspective may use the brain as a shortcut for complex phenomena (e.g., “the brain can help us forget painful memories”) or may suggest that related technology can evaluate the brain (Racine et al., 2005), as if it were the hard disk in a computer. Neurobabble is neuroscientific information that is irrelevant to, but presented along with, a scientific claim (Misheva, 2020), and has been shown to increase the credibility of such claims. Neurobabble may work due to the appeal of neuro-realism or -essentialism, but may boil down to providing an ostensibly more substantiated perspective of a complex or abstract phenomenon. Neurobabble is a unique variation of invoking scientism (see Haack, 2012), which uses the trappings of science (e.g., “scientific rigor,” “evidence-based,” “based in science”) and the anticipated reader’s deference to science to bypass critical appraisal. Whereas neuroscientific
research has great potential for psychology, expecting immediate, direct application may be overly optimistic (e.g., Schwartz et al., 2016). Psychological assessment practices that invoke neurological jargon or explanation may be accurate, but they may also be invoking the intuitive appeal of neuro-based explanations. School psychologists could benefit from carefully asking “What will these data tell me?” and “How will these data impact my decision making?” in an effort to redirect questions about neurological functioning to socially valid outcomes. While neurological functioning may—and likely does—mediate outcomes for students, framing assessment purpose in this way may help school psychologists to identify and scrutinize evidence for and against a given procedure. For instance, it is intuitive that tests purporting to measure neurological functioning would be useful in the diagnosis of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) given evidence of neurological differences among individuals with and without the disorder. However, such physical (e.g., fMRI) or cognitive (e.g., Working Memory Index) neuromarkers function as poor diagnostic indicators for ADHD (DuPaul & Stoner, 2014, pp. 34-35). The use of neurological information may be included and used appropriately by test developers and promoters, and the presence or reference to neurological information does not immediately indicate misinformation. However, we contend that such neurological data should be linked to student outcomes in order to be useful in practice.

**Evidential Quality in Clinical Assessment**

Carefully evaluating the underlying evidence for a claim should be the norm rather than the exception (Dombrowski et al., 2021). This leads to at least two crucial questions: How much and what type of evidence do we need? For the first question, no one can say ‘how much’ evidence is necessary for an individual to believe a claim; this is a debate that has received substantial attention in philosophy (e.g., Haack, 1993), but only passing treatment in
psychological practice. Furthermore, the question stem, ‘how much...’, may imply a sort of bean counting rather than consideration of the comprehensiveness of the available evidence (whether that is a few sources or many). For the second question, how one intends to interpret and use an argument greatly affects the kinds of evidence one might need; again, there is no simple answer. For evaluating claims related to assessment, with regard to their comprehensiveness and their kind, the school psychologist must carefully evaluate how data from the assessment procedure will be interpreted and used (D. A. Cook et al., 2015; Kane, 2013).

For example, when searching the assessment literature, it is common to encounter a set of studies that support a preferred interpretive approach for an instrument and another set of studies that suggest the opposite conclusion. As noted by Faust (2007), direct contradictions in the literature must be handled with care and selectivity in determining which evidence should be retained. It is not best handled by assuming that all information should be integrated equally. If five pieces of information of low evidential value (for instance, due to methodological gaps) support a preferred approach and one or two pieces of higher value indicate otherwise, most school psychologists would do well to give more weight to the evidence afforded by the former set.

A focused approach to the evaluation of the validity of an instrument or process is possible by identifying the types of inferences to be made using a particular approach. Kane (2013) suggests developing an interpretation/use argument which carefully defines how test data are to be used—and by extension, are useful. More simply, a school psychologist has a hypothesis about how a particular type of test data is useful, and then can go about collecting data to corroborate or falsify that hypothesis (See Table 1). For the researcher, this involves the collection of data from a sample of the population of interest using appropriate methodology and
analysis. However, for clinicians, this likely means referring to the available evidence in the peer-reviewed literature—and short-run empiricism\(^1\). As a comprehensive discussion of evidence for assessment claims is beyond the scope of this manuscript—and would likely warrant multiple chapters to accomplish successfully—interested readers should consider Kane’s (2013) framework and D. A. Cook et al.’s interpretation (2015).

Kane’s (2013) approach to evaluating claims relies heavily on a school psychologist’s understanding of measurement theory, research methodology, and logical reasoning; further buttressing the conclusions of Lilienfeld and colleagues (2017) that a scientist-practitioner, or clinical-science, model of training is essential to produce graduates who are prepared for these challenges. For example, Table 1 outlines a series of measurement and psychometric concepts that are often used to evaluate evidentiary claims about individual instruments and assessment practices in the evidence-based assessment literature. Surveys suggest that the statistical and measurement research methods training in contemporary training programs may not be sufficient to support critical familiarity with such a broad spectrum of approaches (e.g., Aiken et al., 2008). However, such competencies for test use have been articulated for over two decades (Turner et al., 2001). Furthermore, we acknowledge that much of the discussion around hype and various approaches to hyping assessment science are applicable to other areas of school psychological practice, including treatment, consultation, and so forth as evinced by the debates regarding the utility of omnibus prevention models such as RTI. As such, instruction regarding hype should not be limited to assessment or examples from assessment.

\(^1\) Short-run empiricism was defined by Cronbach (1975) as monitoring responses to treatment, and making adjustments as necessary (p. 126), and specifically recommended in school psychology by Reschly et al., (1997).
Table 1

**Types of Evidence by Claim Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Claim</th>
<th>Types of Evidence That may Support This Claim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Text X is useful for diagnosis/classification</td>
<td>● Static psychometric adequacy of relevant scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Correlation with gold standard assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Diagnostic accuracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Sensitivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Specificity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Positive &amp; negative predictive value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Accuracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>○ Positive &amp; negative likelihood ratio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● ROC Curve analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Discrimination analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Longitudinal prediction of outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test X can help identify treatment</td>
<td>● Static psychometric adequacy of relevant scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Longitudinal prediction of outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Evidence dependent upon effectiveness of treatment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test X is useful for progress monitoring</td>
<td>● Static psychometric adequacy of relevant scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Scores are sensitive to change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Test X measures Y</td>
<td>● Static psychometric adequacy of relevant scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Correlation with other measures thought to access the same construct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● MTMM data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Factor analysis data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Item response theory data</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Table based in part on D. A. Cook et al. (2015) and Kane (2013a, 2013b, 2013c).
**Implications for Training**

Preparing students to detect hype, to evaluate assessment claims, and—generally—to think scientifically about assessment clearly spans more than a single assignment or course. Recommendations offered here are provisional and warrant evaluation and likely modification. Pedagogy regarding scientific thinking has a rich and progressive research agenda (e.g., Travers et al., 2016) but is relatively novel in school psychology. Lilienfeld et al. (2017) offered a provisional list of topics grouped by course-type that could be integrated and may help to develop graduate students’ epistemic humility. Similarly, Table 2 provides a list of topics related to epistemic humility, detecting hype of assessment claims, and evaluating assessment claims and suggestions for how those topics may be included across common school psychology graduate coursework. Fortunately, a great number of the topics listed in Table 2 are already taught in school psychology programs (e.g., reliability, validity); however, others may not be taught as often (e.g., racial, ethnic, and gender biases) or may need to be integrated (e.g., how invalid tests may appear useful). More work is necessary to understand how to best prepare students to engage in critical evaluation of assessment evidence. In the following section, we will review instructional strategies that may help students to detect hype and evaluate claims.
Table 2

*Content to promote awareness of biases and epistemic humility by course*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Research Methods</th>
<th>Professional Ethics</th>
<th>Practica &amp; Supervision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Types of hype</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of assessment claims</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>The need for ideological and intellectual diversity in psych science</td>
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<td>Difference between ethnic diversity and stereotyping</td>
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*Note.* Table partially based on Lilienfeld et al. (2017).
First, we recommend that trainers explicitly expose students to instruction on the risks associated with using LVPs (Lilienfeld, 2007; Lilienfeld et al., 2019), detecting hype in psychotherapy (Meichenbaum & Lilienfeld, 2018) and assessment, assessment frameworks (Hunsley & Mash, 2007), and evaluating claims (Travers, 2016). This type of explicit instruction may occur as early as an introductory course in school psychology, but may also clearly fit in coursework on assessment, measurement and statistics, research methods, and ethics. Explicit instruction may include providing definitions, giving examples from the field, or selecting exemplars from outside of school psychology that may be less controversial and easier to teach such as learning styles or whole language reading instruction. Schmaltz and Lilienfeld (2014) discuss teaching students scientific thinking and healthy skepticism by way of discussing paranormal investigators and homeopathy. Not only may this content be engaging for students, it may provide opportunities to discuss blatant examples of hype, the prevalence of hype in student’s everyday lives, and strategies of identifying underlying claims. Given that multiple exemplar training is a beneficial way for students to learn how to apply new skills, beginning with extreme examples and then moving to more nuanced examples may provide students with an opportunity to learn and generalize knowledge about hype. Consider the following pedagogical example.

As Schmaltz and Lilienfeld (2014) suggest, ghost hunting television shows may be an excellent opening to discuss hype and the importance of scrutinizing claims. In such programs, the hosts often discuss their status within their community (appeals to eminence) and expertise with various technology (similar to appeals to clinical judgment), the technical qualities of their instruments (the use of science jargon is similar to neurobabble), and so on. An instructor might challenge students to watch a portion of such a program and report back on the types of hype they identify. They may select a low-value assessment practice and briefly review how hype is
used as part of its promotion. For instance, appeals to clinical judgment are common in the interpretation of projective measures (Lilienfeld et al., 2008) and cognitive profile data (e.g., Macmann & Barnett, 1997). Similarly, some assessment proponents may use neurobabble, such as various brain training programs and their related assessments, to make their instrument seem like it’s based firmly in neurology.

In addition to the previous example, there are a number of resources available online and in the peer-reviewed literature to help build scientific thinking skills, including popular science articles on popular LVPs (e.g., French, 2013), Cuijpers and Cristea’s (2016) paper on questionable practices regarding therapy development, and critical discussions of research (e.g., https://sciencebasedmedicine.org). Other approaches might include a book club for Dan Willingham’s (2012) book entitled When Can You Trust the Experts? How to Tell Good Science from Bad in Education; challenging students to identify hype at state, national, and international conferences; or encouraging students to review online brochures and slides for examples of hype.

As this is a developing area of research, especially in school psychology, the authors have developed a shared repository on Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/shpez/?view_only=5235977eb6034a40818addac490fe871) to collect resources. Readers who are interested are invited to contribute by e-mailing the lead author.

Detecting hype is crucial to evidence-based practice, but is not the ultimate goal. The next step is to identify the claim being made by the proponents of the instrument. For instance, in promoting instruments on social maladjustment, promoters claim that their instrument can discern when a student’s challenging behavior is due to social maladjustment and when it is due to other emotional causes. While the marketing material of such scales may invoke expertise and appeal to clinical judgment, it may lack coherence with the literature (e.g., Costenbader &
Buntaine, 1999). That said, regardless of whether it is hyped using one strategy or many, the goal is to determine whether it adequately discriminates between students with social maladjustment and emotional disturbance.²

Discerning the purpose of an assessment instrument requires clarity regarding what the obtained data may say about the student, how that data may be used in decision making, and so forth (see Dombrowski et al., 2021). As a result, students may benefit from explicit instruction on assessment frameworks such as evidence-based assessment³ (Hunsley & Mash, 2007; Youngstrom et al., 2015) and Kane’s (2013) approach to validity arguments to realize the purpose of various assessments. Given knowledge of the topic, school psychologists then need to determine if the instrument must have a minimal amount of evidence or if it must be accompanied by a significant amount of evidence. This notion was eloquently summarized by Asimov (1983) as, “I’ll believe anything, no matter how wild and ridiculous, if there is evidence for it. The wilder and more ridiculous something is, however, the firmer and more solid the evidence will have to be.” (p. 43). Effectively, the more grandiose the claim, the more evidence the proponent or publisher will need to provide; this is particularly true when a claim contradicts long-standing, replicated empirical outcomes. We can likely agree that the amount of evidence one needs to believe that a curriculum-based measure tells us something about a student’s academic performance when used as a screening tool is decidedly less than the amount of evidence one would need to believe that a rating scale can distinguish between social maladjustment and emotional disturbance. However, as discussed previously, the ‘amount’ of

² Given the absence of a documented empirical distinction between social maladjustment and emotional disturbance, one might conclude that any such instrument must meet a significant burden of proof before it could be used in practice as it contradicts the existing literature base.

³ The terms “evidence-based assessment” and “evidence-based practice” may be invoking scientism in the use of the term “evidence-based” and we remind readers that hype alone is not an indicator of false information, and a thorough review of the underlying claims are necessary. Simply, referring to a practice as “evidence-based” does not make it so (Haack, 2012, Willingham, 2012).
evidence one needs is unclear and is an open debate and will depend on whether the measure is being used for low- or high-stakes decision-making. That said, Kane’s (2013) approach to validation helps to address the types of evidence one might need. Instruction regarding the varied skills necessary to locate existing research evidence; to conduct novel, rigorous and transparent research; and to integrate evidence into one’s practice are all challenges that graduate trainers in school psychology programs across the country already face.

**Conclusion**

The work that school psychologists do is of critical importance, and the implementation of evidence-based practices is paramount to avoid as much harm as possible while doing as much good as possible (see Lilienfeld et al., 2019). Adopting a sense of humility about our own practice- and theory-related beliefs is crucial to successfully navigating these responsibilities, and that doing so may help us to evaluate our beliefs and claims. However, it is not always easy to parse claims about evidence for a given assessment practice, especially when some claims are hyped. Hype tactics may seem harmless, but may also disarm critical thought or be used as evidence in their own right (Willingham, 2012). We should always be skeptical of our own beliefs and of the claims made by others; however, it is not feasible to critically evaluate every claim—no one has the time, resources, or training to accomplish such a task (Gambrill, 2008). Readers are cautioned that the presence of one or many of the warning signs presented by Pratkanis (1995), Meichenbaum and Lilienfeld (2018), or those uniquely presented here do not reduce the credibility of individual scientific claims. However, because similar tactics are used to mask or suppress negative evidence or to exaggerate the effectiveness or efficacy of practices, these warning signs may serve as useful discriminative stimuli for a more comprehensive critical evaluation of underlying evidence.
Successfully preparing graduate students to be better able to spot hyped claims in assessment and better able to critically evaluate the evidence for such claims are not easy tasks, and there is much work ahead of us. Indeed, though we have provided a number of examples in this manuscript, we have not addressed all instances of hype within our field. Because these tasks are so varied and sometimes difficult to discern, it is important to consider the specific outcomes we might expect from successfully promoting these skills in graduate students. In the short term, we might observe greater acceptability of evidence-based practices, recognition of the limits of our current evidence base, and the ability to detect when claims are more or less supported by available evidence. Ideally, we would want these findings to be stable over time and, if so, should expect better clinical outcomes for students who do well with such content. In doing so, it is important to reinforce to future school psychologists that while this work may force us to confront uncomfortable truths and potentially disregard long-standing “sacred cows,” these should not be regarded as moments of despair; they illustrate progress in our field through the process of scientific self-correction.
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